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A secure Analog Public PUF (Physically Unclonable Function) would be a significant 
advancement for computer security. It offers several advantages over digital PUFs, but it 
has not yet been shown that one could satisfy reasonable demands of repeatability, 
uniqueness, and resistance to attacks. In this thesis I improve a current analog PUF design, 





CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 PUFs 
 A PUF, or Physically Unclonable Function, is a secure hardware device that takes 
a challenge and produces a unique but recognizable response. These have significant value 
due to the implication that one would have to physically steal the PUF in order to get access 
to the secured system it protects. Standard PUFs rely on the fact that the circuit is unknown 
to the public, and that its function is complex enough that responses cannot be guessed 
given the inputs. This has some major weaknesses. Some PUFs can be vulnerable to 
modeling attacks, in which the attacker models the characteristics of a PUF well enough to 
guess the function [1]. Others rely on a limited set of challenges that could be stored in a 
look-up table. Finally, since all PUFs rely on the secrecy of the design, this could be 
compromised without the owner’s knowledge. 
1.2 PPUFs  
 Public PUFs are functionally very similar but allow for wider, albeit more nuanced, 
applications. The internal circuitry of the PUF is modeled before distribution, and the 
model is released to the public so that anyone can simulate a challenge-response pair. The 
security of PPUFs rely not on any secrecy, but on the wide discrepancy between response 
time of a physical PPUF and simulation of its model. This is known as the Execution-
Simulation Gap, or ESG. To verify the owner of a PPUF, one can simulate a particular 




challenge within a set period of time. If the response comes fast enough, the owner must 
have the actual PPUF.  
1.2.1 PPUF Fitness Metrics 
There are three primary measures that make a good PPUF. They are: 
 Uniqueness – Since the properties of each PPUF are determined by process 
variations in a common design, the output must adequately amplify these 
differences so that as many unique PUFs as possible can be obtained from a set 
number of circuits produced. 
 Reliability – PUFs must be reliable, primarily over temperature, so that they can 
be identified properly in a variety of environments. 
 Resistance to attacks – PPUFs are relatively resistant to attacks due to their public 
nature, but there are still a few types of attacks that must be taken into account. 
The most obvious are simulation attacks, in which the attacker is able to simulate 
the PPUF fast enough to appear to be one. Attackers can also build hardware or 
firmware based on the model to closely approximate a specific PPUF. This second 
type of attack is a major weakness of most private PUFs, as they rely on the secrecy 
of the model to prevent reverse engineering attacks. 
 Entropy – Although the model is public, it still has to be sufficiently complex. 
Entropy mostly feeds back into uniqueness, which requires small process 




in which changes in either the challenge or the process variation must result in a 






CHAPTER 2. STATE OF THE ART 
The two main PPUFs that are comparable to the new Analog PPUF design are the Arbiter 
PUF, a standard in the field, and the relatively new “NanoPPUF” bidirectional PUF. 
2.1 Arbiter PUF 
 Arbiter PUFs build on the very first PUF design. They are based on XOR gates 
strung together, as seen in a heavily simplified configuration in Figure 1, to produce 
variable but repeatable glitching at the output [2]. 
 
Figure 1 – Simplified Arbiter PUF [3] 
 The glitches change with process variation and different inputs, making it a good candidate 
for a PUF. Two of these are placed in parallel and fed into an arbiter, which gives a simple 
bit output based on which circuit had a higher delay. This removes the need for 
prohibitively accurate sensing of the output signal timing. Arbiter PUFs make very secure 
private PUFs because they operate by obfuscating simple building blocks. This makes them 




PPUF, one can build reverse-engineered hardware or firmware with an insignificantly 
small ESG [4].  
2.2 “Nano” Network PUF 
 “Nano” PUFs diverge from delay-based sensing by creating a large network of 
simple connections between ports and nodes [5]. NanoPPUFs use memristors formed at 
random points on a grid between a set number of bidirectional ports to create circuit blocks, 
as seen in Figure 2.  
 
Figure 2 – NanoPPUF array with adjacent cells to be connected highlighted for three 
possible configurations 
These blocks form an array and can be connected in an exponential number of ways to 
form unique circuits. Since the inputs, configuration, and outputs can be controlled, it 
would take prohibitively long to simulate the entire NanoPPUF. Only a few outputs are 
required to verify the identity of the circuit, however, so verification simulations can be 




meets the metrics of repeatability, uniqueness, and security. It is likely susceptible to 
modeling attacks due to the simple nature of the blocks. One paper in particular suggests 




CHAPTER 3. ANALOG PPUF DESIGN 
3.1 Previous Work 
 The design outlined here is based on work done by Sabyasachi Deyati as part of his 
dissertation work. In a paper he designs a PUF using a simple push-pull inverter circuit [7]. 
The push-pull transistors are small in size to increase the effect of process variations. 
Deyati et al. also added biasing resistors, seen in Figure 3, to make the simulation harder 
by preventing clipping at the rails.  
 
Figure 3 – (a) Analog PUF architecture (b) Push-pull amplifier 
Instead of taking a set of inputs and waiting for an output to arrive like traditional 
delay-based PUFs, the Analog PUF takes a continuous analog challenge as an input to a 
push-pull inverter and samples the output of the inverter. This makes extracting and 
distributing the model for each PUF relatively easy because there are only two transistors 
per inverter that must be characterized.  
 It was shown that the Analog PUF makes a good PUF due to a relatively high 




balance the variance with temperature against the ability to differentiate PUFs. This design 
also took advantage of challenge engineering, increasing the performance of the PUF but 
adding a possible avenue of attack by simplifying the necessary Look Up Tables (LUTs). 
 It was also shown with preliminary testing of this design as a PPUF that model 
extraction, outlined in Figure 4 with results presented in Figure 5, of the push-pull amplifier 
is very promising [7]. 
 














Figure 5 – Successful modeling of APPUF 
 The error in the output symbols was 0.38%, and it was shown that the error was 
primarily a result of quantization. Having this error as low as possible is important for a 
PPUF as the entire verification process is predicated on the accuracy of the given model. 
3.2 Design Process 
Most of the work toward this thesis was put into changing and iterating designs. 
Of several alternate designs, the one most tested was a cascaded current mirror. The 
design was chosen due to the ability to place them in series, as seen in Figure 6, to make 
simulation harder. When carefully operated in the nonlinear region, these current mirrors 
showed promisingly large output variance with process variations. With so many 




The design was eventually abandoned due to this modeling issue, as well as concerns over 
possible simulation shortcuts. 
 
Figure 6 – Current mirror PPUF test bench 
Modifications were also made to the push-pull amplifier design. The first and most 
obvious change was to move the difference amplification to before the conversion from 
analog to digital, as seen in Figure 7. This reduces the number of ADCs, and allows the 
ADC to capture the true range of the data of interest instead of the raw output of each push-





Figure 7 – New ADC and diff. amp placement 
The next major change was to switch the input to a filtered bitstream instead of an 
engineered analog challenge. This allowed for higher simulation load to communication 
load ratios. The removal of challenge engineering reduces the risk of LUT-based attacks. 
The removal of the high-speed input DAC also considerably simplifies the APPUF and 
reduces the power consumption.  
Next the bias selection seen in Figure 8 was added. Four levels were chosen for 
each power and ground. By creating a feedback between current draw at the output and 
power supply level, simulation was slowed down by a factor of four. Since the power 
supply changes once for every ten bits input to the push-pull amplifier, two distinct rates 
of charging and discharging are created, making periodic simulation shortcuts more 
difficult. Capacitors were added to the rail, carefully chosen to be large enough to give the 
supply a long memory but still small enough to stay on the proper timescale and allow 





Figure 8 – Bias selection circuit (Vdd side) 
Differentiating between APPUFs was difficult for very similar values between the 
two amplifiers. It was rare for all four Vth’s to line up, but when it did happen the 
differential signal amplitude dipped into the tens of millivolts or smaller and the ADC had 
to be very high resolution to pick up the difference output. Since the amplitude of the 
difference was found to be constant with the same APPUF but different challenges, an 
analog normalizer was added before the ADC, as seen in Figure 9. An arbitrary preset 
challenge can be run through the APPUF, and the output scaled to fit the full scale range 
of the ADC. Subsequent challenges will then be observed at maximum resolution with a 





Figure 9 - Normalizer 
Finally, results were varying widely over different temperatures. The circuit was designed 
to amplify process variations, but the same characteristics being observed also tend to 
change with temperature, as seen in Figure 13. This was solved by adding a temperature 
sensor. Models could be found for the APPUF over a range of temperatures, then when an 
APPUF is to be verified its temperature is read and the correct model for that temperature 
can be simulated to check against with minimal variance. The filtering was also modified 
so that temperature changes could not attenuate the signals enough to cause a loss of 
process variable information. 
3.3 Final Design 
The APPUF takes a bitstream challenge of any length from the verifier. For every 
fourteen bits, ten are fed identically into the amplifiers, and two are fed into each of the rail 
selects for the amplifiers. Each amplifier has an LPF to smooth the bitstream input which 
is put through the push-pull amplifiers with resistive biasing and HPF capacitors. The two-
bit words applied to the bias selection are used to choose between four power rail levels 




sharing only the input word and supplies. A capacitor smooths each the rail voltages and 
allows for charging and discharging through the output.  
 
Figure 10 – Push-pull amplifier with filtering and bias select 
The difference between the amplifier outputs is then taken. Since both nominally 
identical amplifiers are receiving the same challenge and bias, the only difference at the 
output will be as a result of the process variations present in the circuits. The difference 
signal is normalized to the full scale of the ADC, then converted to a three-bit output 













CHAPTER 4. ANALOG PPUF ANALYSIS 
4.1 Analysis Process 
 Design and simulation of the APPUF was performed in Cadence’s Virtuoso tool, 
with simulation using the Spectre simulator. Batches of simulations were originally run via 
Ocean scripts for the first several months, but this quickly became tedious for the number 
of small changes that had to be made to the design and simulation environments. Since 
Matlab was used as a shell for setting up and starting simulations, it was much more 
efficient to interface directly with the Analog Design Environment GUI for importing 
settings and kicking off simulation runs.  
 Matlab did most of the heavy lifting for this project, automatically generating 
stimulus files, process corners and much more. Since storage of output data quickly became 
an issue, only the single analog output between the differential amplifier and the normalizer 
was recorded in Cadence’s “.psf” file format. Normalization and quantization were 
performed in Matlab to streamline the process. See Appendix B for more details. 
 Unless otherwise noted, all simulations shown below were recorded using a sample 
of 200 PPUFs, run for a length of 5us execution time with the output ADC taking 3000 





In Figure 12 we can see the input challenge bitstream, the outputs of each push-pull 
amplifier, and the normalized difference taken between the two, which is the input to the 
ADC. The amplifiers function as poor inverters, with enough variance in their shape to 
make the difference output hard to predict.  
 
Figure 12 – Signals from random sample APPUF: bitstream, output of each push-pull 
amplifier, and the differential input to the ADC 
One of the important metrics we identified was reliability over a range of 
temperatures. Since the APPUF is necessarily sensitive to temperature as covered above, 
the most important metric is that APPUF outputs still retain a distinctive shape so that they 





Figure 13 – Input to the ADC for the same APPUF over temperature range 
 Temperature variability is further analyzed when we start looking at pairwise 
distance metrics below.  
Next we start analysis of a batch of 200 APPUFs with normally distributed process 
variation over ±20% Vth, σ = 6%. First, we can see that the inputs to the ADC are well 





Figure 14 – Input to the ADC for 200 different APPUFs 
The two most similar inputs to the ADC of the 200 APPUFs by two different 





Figure 15 – Input to the ADC for most similar pair of APPUFs for two different 
measurement methods 
This supports the use of Manhattan distance as a measure of the “closeness” of two 
APPUFs, while showing that the human eye can still differentiate them, if only barely.  





Figure 16 – Output of the ADC for most similar pair of APPUFs for two different 
measurement methods 
Again we can see that with only 3 bits per sample, we can differentiate even the 
most similar of APPUFs. Assuming a perfectly accurate model can be created, we can 
identify and differentiate every one of the 200 APPUFs at all temperatures from -20°C to 
120°C.  
To dive further into differentiability, we next look at the distance between pairs of 
APPUFs. The traditional method of distance between PUFs is Hamming distance, with an 
average Hamming distance of 50% indicating maximum entropy. In the histogram of 
Figure 17 we can see that the minimum Hamming distance was 4.59%, with the worst 





Figure 17 – Histogram distribution of pairwise Hamming distances for 200 process 
varied APPUFs across range of temperatures 
This is not a proper metric for our APPUF, however, due to the analog nature of 
our true output. A better distance metric is the Manhattan distance, whose distribution can 





Figure 18 – Distribution of pairwise Manhattan distances for 200 APPUFs taken 
before the ADC 
Manhattan distance more accurately captures the arithmetic distance between two 
analog signals, without amplifying noisy outliers like the Euclidean measures used in 
previous work by Deyati et al. do.  
Furthermore, the Manhattan distance is well preserved through the quantization 





Figure 19 – Distribution of pairwise Manhattan distances for 200 APPUFs taken after 
the ADC 
 Using the Manhattan distance between the APPUF being verified and our APPUF 
model to determine identity gives us considerable leeway in choosing where to cut off 
clustering radii depending on the desired yield and noise floor.  
 Deyati et al. already showed the feasibility of highly accurate modeling of his 
Analog PUF [7]. Since the heart of inverter is the same, it follows that modeling will be 
just as successful with the new design. Unfortunately, creating a production-worthy model 
builder would take considerable expertise and months of time, and drawing conclusions 
from a sub-standard model builder would be meaningless. Instead, we can look at the 










Figure 21 – ADC output for two APPUFs identical except for 2% change in a single 
Vth value 
Although Figure 14 shows that the waveform shape of the APPUF output varies 
widely and in a hard-to-predict manner between APPUFs, Figure 20 shows us that with 
small, predictable changes of circuit parameters we see similarly small, predictable changes 
in the output. This not only bodes well for model building, but also suggests that APPUF 
models can remain accurate with device aging and other nonidealities, as seen in Figure 
21. If component drift can be predicted, the output models can be adjusted with no 




Finally, the APPUFs were tested for simulation time. Running Cadence’s Spectre 
circuit simulator on the fastest settings available, an ESG ratio of about 231,165 was 
achieved. This is linear over increasing challenge lengths, as shown in Figure 22.  
 
Figure 22 – ESG scaling 
 The width of the line shows the slight variability from run to run in how fast Spectre 





CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
This report proposes a modified design for a new Analog Public Physically 
Unclonable Function and analyzes its fitness for use as such. The APPUF is topically 
salient in a world increasingly concerned with hardware vulnerability to cyber-attacks [8].  
5.1 Fitness Metrics Revisited 
In order to show that our design is useful as a PPUF, we have observed indicators 
of each of the stated metrics for a PPUF. It was shown that the APPUF has 100% 
uniqueness for 200 random samples. The APPUF was reliable over temperature, 
maintaining its uniqueness even at extreme temperatures of -20°C and 120°C. We have 
shown the APPUF to have a six figure ESG, making simulation attacks impossible when 
verification is performed properly. With a carefully designed circuit, we have ensured that 
although the ESG could be reduced further with parallelization and clever simulation 
shortcuts, there are enough feedback loops and nonlinearities that the ESG would still be 
orders of magnitude higher than necessary. Since the execution time of our APPUF is 
inherently scalable, the ESG can be further exploited to overcome slow communications 
that could otherwise mask long simulation times. The APPUF is also intrinsically resistant 
to reverse engineering attacks because it is a deceptively simple nonlinear circuit. More 
complex circuits, such as an Arbiter PUF or even a NanoPPUF, are much easier to engineer 
because their relatively simple building blocks can be reproduced via other methods and 
assembled to mimic the whole. Finally, the one metric not addressed previously is entropy 




it is to an Arbiter PUF, in which single bits are given as output. As stated in the 
introduction, entropy is really an indicator of uniqueness and resistance to attack; since it 
can be shown that we have both, a direct measure of entropy becomes less necessary. Still, 
Figure 14 in conjunction with our average Hamming distance of practically 50% provide a 
basis for stating that the APPUF design has adequate entropy to be useful as a PPUF.  
5.2 Future Work 
 The obvious next step would be to get a batch of APPUFs laid out and manufactured 
so that they can be modeled and tested against the simulated results here. Before 
manufacturing, however, there are a few more areas to be exhausted in the name of rigor.  
First, a definite model building process should be laid out and tested with the final 
APPUF design. Next, this model should be tested against a large sample of realistically 
varied APPUFs to get a score of uniqueness more accurate to a physically implemented 
PPUF. This can inform decisions about clustering beyond the current method of giving 
each APPUF its own cluster because they are all distinct.  
Next, a more thorough examination of simulation techniques, model defeat and 
entropy should be conducted. Ideally, an expert third party could be recruited to work on 






APPENDIX A. DESIGN VALUES 
 






Table 1 – Final Design Values 
Amplifier Design Values 
Variable Value Description 
GND1 0V 1st ground select 
GND2 50mV 2nd ground select 
GND3 100mV 3rd ground select 
GND4 150mV 4th ground select 
VDD1 1.2V 1st power select 
VDD2 1.08V 2nd power select 
VDD3 960mV 3rd power select 
VDD4 840mV 4th power select 
CAP_LOAD 10fF used for filtering outputs 
Cc 1fF Input HPF 
Cin 2pF Input LPF 
Rin 2.5kΩ Input LPF 
Ln1 50nS Length of push-pull NMOS 
Lp1 50nS Length of push-pull PMOS 
Wn1 50nS Width of push-pull NMOS 
Wp1 150nS Width of push-pull PMOS 
Vtn_nom 471mV Nominal threshold voltage NMOS 







APPENDIX B. MATLAB SNIPPETS 
 
Figure 24 – Data import, sampling and normalization 
 
 





Figure 26 – Distance measures 
 
 
Figure 27 – Threshold voltage generation 
 
 






Figure 29 – Create challenge bitstream 
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